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In 2005 the Government of Indonesia introduced an 
unconditional cash transfer program called the ‘Bantuan 
Langsung Tunai’ (BLT), aimed at assisting poor people who 
were suffering from the removal of a fuel subsidy. There are 
concerns, however, that the introduction of a public transfer 
system can negatively affect inter-household transfers through 
the crowding-out effect, which exists when donor households 
reduce the amount of their transfers in line with public 
transfers received from the government. The poor may not 
therefore have received any meaningful impact from the 
public cash transfer, as they potentially receive fewer transfers 
from inter-household private donors. For the government to 
design a public transfer system, it is necessary to properly 
understand the dynamics of private transfer behaviour. Hence, 
this study evaluates whether a crowding-out effect of public 
transfers exists on inter-household transfers in Indonesia.
Using data from the Indonesia Family Life Survey (IFLS) and by 
applying Coarsened Exact Matching (CEM) and Difference-in-
differences (DID) approaches, this study found that the 
likelihood to receive transfers from other family members 
(non-co-resident) reduces when the household receives BLT. 
However, there is no significant impact of BLT on transfers 
from parents and friends.
Pada tahun 2005, Pemerintah Indonesia memperkenalkan 
program pemberian uang tunai tanpa syarat, disebut “Bantuan 
Langsung Tunai (BLT), bertujuan untuk membantu rakyat 
miskin yang meenjadi korban atas pencabutan subsidi bahan 
bakar. Akan tetapi, ada beberapa pertimbangan bahwa 
pengenalan program bantuan public tersebut berdampak 
negative terhadap pemberian (transfer) antar rumah tangga 
melalui efek “crowding-out”. Efek tersebut muncul ketika 
rumah tangga donor mengurangi jumlah pemberian kepada 
rumah tangga yang diketahuin pada saat bersamaan menerima 
BLT. Sehingga, rakyat miskin mungkin tidak menerima dampak 
yang berarti dari bantuan publik tersebut, karena bantuan dari 
rumah tangga lain yang biasa mereka terima menjadi lebih 
kecil. Oleh karena itu, tulisan ini mengevaluasi apakah ada 
“crowding-out” effect akibat bantuan public terhadap bantuan 
(transfer) antar rumah tangga di Indonesia.
Menggunakan data dari Indonesia Family Life Survey (IFLS) 
dan mengaplikasikan Coarsened Exact Matching (CEM) dan 
Differnce-in-differences (DID), dihasilkan bahwa kemungkinan 
rumah tangga menerima bantuan dari anggota keluarga lain 
(yang tidak serumah) berkurang ketika rumah tangga tersebut 
menerima BLT. Akan tetapi, tidak ada dampak yang signfikan 
terhadap bantuan (transfer) dari orangtua dan teman.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Indonesia implemented its first cash transfer 
system in 2005, which was an unconditional cash 
transfer program, known as the Bantuan Langsung 
Tunai  (BLT). This program was designed to assist the 
poor, who were facing a crisis caused by an increase 
of fuel prices. However, the effectiveness of this 
cash transfer has received attention and debate. For 
example, Hastuti et al. (2006) studied the impact 
of BLT on the poverty rate and found that this cash 
program would not decrease the poverty rate. Using 
a simple simulation model, Hastuti et al. (2006) found 
that the poverty rate reached 17.9 percent after the 
implementation of BLT, which was still higher than 
those in 2004 before the program was introduced. 
While the purpose of BLT was to dampen the effect 
of the increasing gas price on the poor households’ 
welfare, this program has not helped much to decrease 
the poverty rate.
The direct effect of the price shocks on household 
welfare depends on incident of fuel consumption. 
Nevertheless, fuel consumptions have small shares 
on overall households expenditure. Poor households 
spend 65 to 75 per cent of their budget on food (World 
Bank 2012). Therefore, the effects of the price shocks 
of fuel on purchasing power may through indirect 
channels. 
The increase in fuel prices will rise the cost 
of distribution goods and producing goods using 
substantial fuel-based input. As the results, the 
increase in fuel prices induces consumer price 
inflation. Based on SUSENAS data, over the 2005 to 
2006, the CPI increased by 17,9%. Therefore, both 
poor and near-poor households would be significantly 
affected by domestic inflation (World Bank 2012).
Since decades, several studies try to examine 
the problem facing by BLT to meet the objective. For 
example, World Bank (2012) claimed that although 
BLT was the most well-targeted among any Indonesian 
social assistance initiative with national coverage, 
there was still big issues on the delivering process. 
There were some households who eligible to receive 
BLT but did not receive, and vice versa.
Another study by Hossain (2012) found that in 
the Papuan communities, where almost all residents 
receive BLT, the amounts compare to the cost of living 
were said to too small, and some people said it barely 
justified the cost and effort of collecting the payment. 
In place where the cost of living is lower than Papua, 
the amounts might be significant. The difference of 
the cost living might be the issues for this program in 
order to assist all the poor. 
While in Indonesia, many studies found some 
issues from targeting and enforcement of this program 
which determines whether such cash transfer program 
meet its objectives, there are some study in other 
countries try to relate the cash transfers program on 
to the inter-households transfer. For example, Teruel 
and Davis (2000) found evidence that PROGRESA (cash 
transfer program in Mexico) is crowding out private 
transfers. In addition, Kang & Swada (2009) found that 
a crowding out relation between public cash transfers 
and private transfers was observed before crisis in 
Korea, but become a crowing in relation after the 
crisis.
Therefore, it may be interesting to examine the 
possibility that BLT may cause a reduction in private 
transfers through crowding-out inter-household 
transfers to members of beneficiary households from 
outside private donors. Contributors to households 
may be dissuaded from further transfers if they 
observe the recipient of government transfers. On 
the other hand, the donors who do not live nearby 
the households may continue supplying transfers 
regardless the receipt of government transfers. 
Traditionally in Indonesia, where kinship ties 
remain active and strong, informal private transfers 
have acted as a social security safety net when facing 
economic crises. Furthermore, the World Bank (cited 
in Kang & Sawada 2009), reported that Indonesian 
households were able to manage their change in 
living standards precipitated by the crisis through 
asset sales, dissaving and private transfer. The World 
Bank argued that the receiving and giving of transfers 
became an informal social safety net for the poor 
facing the crisis.
The substitution of private inter-households 
transfers by BLT can be an indication of informal 
mechanism of exchange. As BLT is temporary support 
program, this disruption can be dangerous because 
such a long social security safety net was altered by 
the temporary support program. In addition, if such 
substitution is occurring, it will reduce the impact of 
BLT over total household income, thus weaken the 
objectives of the program. 
Many studies of developing countries have found 
that between 20 – 90 percent of households receive 
and give transfers with other households. Park (2003) 
found that, in Indonesia, between 2 to 20 percent of 
total household’s income was transferred. In addition, 
according to data from the Indonesian Family Life 
Survey (IFLS-3), 56 percent of households reported 
providing a financial transfer to a non-resident family 
household. These transfers represent 7 percent of the 
average monthly household expenditure for the net 
recipients of transfers (Park, 2003). (These numbers 
exclude inter-sibling and intra-household transfer.) 
Hence, inter-household transfer plays a significant 
role in people’s maintenance of their living standards.
To design a public cash transfer system, an 
understanding of private transfer behavior is 
important. Both public and private transfers have 
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a similar objective, which is to help the poor. The 
benefit of public cash transfers is they become an 
additional income for households. However, before 
implementation of such a public system, it is necessary 
to evaluate whether donor households change or 
reduce their private transfers to poor households 
when there is a cash transfer from government. Such 
analysis is relevant to government stimulus programs 
in the wake of economic crises.
Several studies have discussed the topic of 
inter-household transfers in Indonesia. For example, 
Park (2003) studied the determinant and motive of 
these transfers, finding that recipient income does 
not affect the transfer value from child to parents, 
but was negatively correlated with the transfer from 
parents and siblings. The current study aims to fill the 
literature gap by evaluating whether the probability 
of receiving inter-household transfers was affected by 
the existence of a public transfer program in Indonesia.
Therefore, this paper analyses whether the 
presence of BLT as a public cash transfer system 
crowded out the frequency of inter-household transfers 
in Indonesia. The presence of such crowding-out effect 
can indicate the effectiveness of a public transfer 
program by the government. 
This study is expected to contribute to the 
literature in terms of evaluating the existence of the 
crowding-out effect of cash transfer programs on 
inter-households transfers in Indonesia, specifically in 
relation to the government’s BLT program. In terms of 
methodology, in this study we model the treatment 
assignment using Coarsened Exact Matching (CEM) and 
difference-in-differences (DID) to reduce the selection 
bias due to the use of non-randomized data. 
This study is comprised of five sections. The first 
section introduces the general background of the topic 
and the debate surrounding it, the research gap and 
question, and the objective  and methods of this paper. 
The second section presents theoretical frameworks 
and some background on the Direct Cash Assistance 
(BLT) program in Indonesia specifically. The third 
section discusses the data and the empirical strategy 
that will be used to test the hypothesis. The fourth 
section explains the results and the fifth presents the 
conclusion. Then, final section mentions the limitation 
of this study.
2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
There is a growing literature regarding the 
existence of the crowding-out effect on the relationship 
between inter-household transfers and income 
recipients. For example, Cox, Hansen & Jimenez 
(2004), and Kazianga (2005) found that the pattern 
of private transfer changed when there was a change 
in household income recipients in the Philippines. 
Kazianga (2005) used threshold regression to analyse 
a low-income country, Burkina Faso, which has a 
tradition of ‘gift-giving’, but does not have a formal 
system of public transfer. Specifically, addressing 
endogeneity, he found the existence of an altruism 
motive at the intermediate level of income. Donor 
households tended to reduce the amount of transfers 
when the income of recipients increases. However, 
there was different result for the low-income level, 
where there was no crowding-out effect of public 
transfer on inter-household transfer. 
Theoretically, the negative association between 
the income and the amount of transfers means that 
the addition of extra income (in the form of public 
transfers) will reduce the amount of inter-household 
transfers. However, most of studies did not directly 
evaluate public transfers in relation to the crowding 
out effect. It would therefore be interesting to use 
public cash transfers to evaluate the relationship 
between recipients’ incomes and inter-household 
transfers. 
Government intervention of the provision of 
public transfers to the poor is a popular policy around 
the world, not only in developing countries, but also 
in some middle-income countries, such as Brazil and 
Mexico. It is obvious that this programs design to 
transfer money to the poor, but it may involve a trade-
off related to the targeting process. For this reason, 
policymakers who are thinking about potential 
interventions must consider anything that could pose 
a challenge for the program to achieve its objectives.
The implementation of a public transfer system 
as government policy, however, is expected to 
reduce the frequency of private transfers that form 
the informal social safety net for communities. This 
crowding out effect exists when donor households 
reduce their amount of transfers in accordance with 
public transfers received by the government. For 
example, the beneficiaries of a cash transfer may 
usually receive this transfer from their parents. After 
this household begins to receive a public cash transfer 
from the government, however, their parents may 
reduce or even completely stop providing their private 
transfers. Therefore, the net intended benefit of the 
public transfers may not fully meet the government’s 
objectives.   
Recently, many studies have adopted a new 
approach in analysis of the crowding-out effect. 
Instead of using the recipient’s income, they evaluate 
the crowding-out effect of public transfer by directly 
applying the public transfer as an independent 
variable (Jung & Pirog, 2015; Kang & Sawada, 2009). 
These studies have found that the magnitude of 
private transfers reduces when the household 
receives public transfers. However, Kang (2004) argues 
that public transfers reduce neither the magnitude 
nor the likelihood of inter-household transfers. Using 
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probit and tobit analysis, he found that the probability 
of receiving a private transfer was not significantly 
correlated with household size in Nepal. Therefore, 
debate remains as to whether such a crowding-out 
effect exists in lower-income countries.
Several studies have discussed the topic of 
inter-household transfers in Indonesia. For example, 
Park (2003) studied the determinant and motive of 
these transfers, finding that recipient income does 
not affect the transfer value from child to parents, 
but was negatively correlated with the transfer from 
parents and siblings. The current study aims to fill the 
literature gap by evaluating whether the probability 
of receiving inter-household transfers was affected by 
the existence of a public transfer program in Indonesia.
2.1. Background of “Bantuan Langsung Tunai / BLT”
In Indonesia, the BLT cash transfers program 
was implemented in 2005, in the aftermath of the 
Government of Indonesia cutting fuel subsidies. Poor 
households benefitted as consumers both directly and 
indirectly through lower fuel prices, and so they faced 
hardship as a result of the subsidy cuts. Furthermore, 
domestic inflation in food prices caused by these fuel 
subsidy cuts would have significant impact for both poor 
and near-poor households (World Bank, 2012), related 
to the fact that spending on food is the largest share 
of expenditure for poor households (65 to 75 percent 
of their budget). As a result, inflation and tighter food 
supplies caused by the removal of the fuel subsidy 
were expected to cause a difficult situation for poor 
households.
To help the poor facing increasing fuel prices, in 
2005 the Government of Indonesia introduced a direct 
cash transfer program. The government decided to 
use a portion of its subsidy savings to help vulnerable 
households in the transition to new fuel prices. The 
form of these cash transfers was an unconditional cash 
transfer called the “Bantuan Langsung Tunai (BLT)”. 
From inception to implementation, BLT took less than 
5 months to develop (World Bank, 2012), and it  was a 
national program that covered all provinces in Indonesia. 
The basic objective of BLT was to assist the poor to meet 
their basic needs and maintain the level of welfare.
The national data collected by the Central Statistic 
Agency (Badan Pusat Statistik or BPS) used to differentiate 
the poor and near-poor households as the targets of 
this programs. Based on this data, the Government of 
Indonesia categorized the targeted households (Rumah 
Tangga Sasaran or RTS) by very poor, poor, and near-poor. 
Then using a proxy mean test for 14 indicators of poor 
households, BPS determine the list of beneficiaries. To 
be nominated as the beneficiaries, the households had 
to meet at least 9 of the 14 indicators defined by BPS 
(see Table 1). The beneficiaries then receive Rp100.000 
per month, per households. The associated procedures 
and rules were regulated in Presidential Instruction 
number 3 in 2008 regarding the implementation of BLT 
for targeted households, and in BLT technical that were 
prepared and published by the Ministry of Social Affairs. 
Overall, this cash transfer program was simple, and its 
regulation were well-prepared.
3. RESEARCH METHODE 
3.1. Data
In this study, most of the data comes from an 
ongoing longitudinal households survey in Indonesia, 
called the “Indonesian Family Life Survey (IFLS)”. The 
first wave of this survey was conducted in 1993 (IFLS1), 
then in 1997 (IFLS2), 2000 (IFLS3), 2007 (IFLS4), and 2014 
(IFLS5). Approximately 83 percent of the Indonesian 
population has been covered by this survey, and the 
sample comes from 13 of 33 provinces in Indonesia. 
As BLT was introduced in 2005, we use the IFLS3 and 
IFLS4 to study its effects, with IFLS3 (2000) as the pre-
treatment wave and IFLS4 (2007) as the post-treatment 
wave. 
The treatment group consists of all households 
reported in IFLS4 as recipients of BLT. Thus, the key 
variable of interest in this study is a dummy variable, 
denoted by BLT, which was equal to 1 if the households 
received BLT. In addition, the outcome variable is a binary 
variable which takes value of 1 if the households receive 
private transfers from non-co-resident households 
(parents, other family, and friends or neighbors).
The descriptive statistics for the full sample, 
according to whether or not the households received 
private transfers, is provided in Table 2. From the 
summary, we can see that the BLT recipients received 
less of the share of inter-household transfers (parents, 
other family, and friends or neighbors). It is also 
interesting to note that, in 2007, overall the share of 
households who received inter-household transfers was 
smaller than others who did not receive such transfers. 
Additionally, households who lived in urban areas were 
more likely to receive the private transfer, compared to 
those who lived in rural areas.
3.2. Estimation Strategy
Evaluating the impact of the policy is challenging 
as it is hard to find a counterfactual who received the 
treatments (i.e. received BLT). Thus, we use matching 
methods as an estimate approach to approximate the 
effect of BLT. To do so, we needed to find a control group 
with similar characteristics to a group of households 
that received the treatments (i.e. a group with similar 
characteristics but who did not receive BLT). 
From the literature, we found examples of some 
poor households who met the criteria to receive 
the BLT (eligible) but did not receive it. For example, 
Cameron (2012) found that 34.9 percent of eligible 
households did not receive the BLT, while 20.6 percent 
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of non-eligible households received the payments. 
Moreover, the World Bank (2006) also stated that there 
is a possibility that not all eligible households received 
the BLT due to distribution problems and imperfect 
data collection mechanisms. These problems may have 
been caused by data collection methods that were 
partial (due to quota requirements) and distorted (due 
to nepotism).
It was important to ensure the sample to be 
analysed contained recipients and non-recipients of 
BLT with similar characteristics. We required the pre-
processing of the samples such that the covariates of 
the treatment group (BLT recipients) and control group 
( non-recipients) were balanced. Once these covariates 
were balanced, it is possible to obtain a random sample, 
as BLT should, in principle, be independent. 
In this study we implement Coarsened Exact 
Matching (CEM), first proposed by Lacus et al (2012), 
to match the treatment group to the non-treatment 
group. This method involves matching a treated with a 
non-treated group that share exactly the same covariate 
values, by coarsening the covariates. By coarsening the 
covariates, we will have a greater possibility to obtain 
observations with the exact value of the coarsened 
properties. 
After having matched, we will estimate Equation 
(1) using logit analysis, with province dummies included 
in all regressions. For sensitivity checks, we also 
estimate by OLS analysis, with the errors clustered at 
province levels.
3.3. Estimation Equation
After we succeed in matching the group by CEM, 
then we regressed the following equation :
yrafter = dummy variable (1= the year after 
treatment has been introduced (2007), 0 = the year 
before treatment (2000); BLT = dummy variable (1 if 
the households receive BLT, 0 otherwise);  X = control 
variable that would affect inter-household transfers, 
including characteristics of households, characteristics 
of the heads of households, and characteristics of the 
spouses of household heads (see appendix A. Table of 
Variables).
The altruistic preference model implies a negative 
correlation between the income of a recipient and the 
amount of a transfer (Park, 2003). To proxy the income, 
we use BLT dummy variable (addition income) as well 
as other income’s proxy. However, due to the limited 
availability of income data, we proxy income using 
expenditure data. Taking the share of expenditure on 
food and education, a higher share of expenditure on 
foods indicates a lower income, and a higher share of 
expenditure on education indicates a higher income.
As some studies have indicated that private 
transfers are disproportionally targeted according 
to gender (e.g  Cox et al., 2004; Gibson, 2006; Park, 
2003), it is of interest to also include a dummy variable 
indicating whether the household is female-headed. We 
expect that female-headed households would receive a 
higher rate of transfers than male-headed households. 
Additionally, following Park (2003), we argue that 
the location the household lives would also affect 
the amount of inter-household transfer. Therefore, 
we include a dummy variable indicating whether the 
household lives in a rural or urban area as a control 
variable.
Finally, as with public transfers, private transfers 
are usually driven by the motivation to help the poor. 
To identify poor households, we use the characteristics 
of households: whether they had electricity and clean 
water, toilets, their source of drinking water, and 
whether they used firewood to cook. In addition, we use 
the characteristics of households heads: education level 
and occupation.
We then regress Equation (1) using logit analysis 
to evaluate the effect of the public transfer on the 
probability of the household receiving an inter-
household transfer (the value of ). We expected that 
the probability of receiving an inter-household transfer 
decreases as the household receives a public transfer. 
Therefore, we expect that the public cash transfer do 
not effectively benefit the poor, and instead simply 
crowded out existing inter-household transfers. 
4. RESULTS 
4.1. Coarsened Exact Matching (CEM) results
From the previous section, we know that there 
are 14 assignment criteria used by the government 
to determine the recipients of BLT. The recipients of 
the BLT were the poorest households, as defined by 
the Central Statistics Agency (Badan Pusat Statistik/
BPS). All indicators were related to the household 
characteristics. Then, we match the treated and 
controlled households based on criteria of the poorest 
households. Due to limitations of the IFLS data, we 
only matched five criteria of the poorest households: 
electricity, source of drinking water, type of floors, type 
of walls, and whether or not households have a toilet. 
By comparing the pre-matching and post-matching 
covariate balances, we argue that the CEM results 
provide a good match (see Table 3). The overall balance 
is improved from 0.2397 to 3.243e-14, while all the 
mean differences are near to zero in the post-match. 
From 20.181 samples, we have 15 unmatched samples 
(see Appendix A2).  It is expected that we can use the 
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sample to estimate the impact of BLT by our regression.
4.2. Regression result
We estimated a regression for Equation 1 using 
both logit and OLS analysis for each type of inter-
household transfers (transfer from parents, transfer 
from other family, and transfer from friends or 
neighbors). The results for both logit and OLS analysis 
are quite similar (see Appendix B1, B2, B3).
4.2.1 Parent transfers
Table 4 presents the marginal effects at means from 
estimating the model in Eq.1 with parent transfers as 
the dependent variable. Surprisingly, we found that BLT 
did not significantly affect the probability of households 
receiving transfers from parents. The parents did not 
adjust their transfers to their child when the child 
receive BLT from GOI. This finding supports the claim 
from Park (2003) that there also exists an “exchange 
motive” for why parents give money to their children. 
Instead of liquidity problems, parents may transfer to 
their children as a compensation for services provided 
by them. This implies that their children’s income level 
may not be the main reason that parents transfer to 
them.
A few other findings are also worth discussing. 
For example, households living in urban areas are most 
likely to receive transfers from their parents. Even 
though the coefficient is small ( less than 0,01), this 
finding is in line with studies by Martin and Dearden (as 
cited in Park 2003), which found that urban households 
receive more transfers, and these are positively 
correlated with income. On the other hand, in rural 
areas, households receive fewer transfers, and these 
transfers are negatively associated with household 
incomes. (Unfortunately, in their study the authors did 
not distinguish the source of transfers.)
Another interesting finding is the relationship 
between the education of spouse on the likelihood of 
parent transfers. From the regression, the possibility 
of receiving a transfer from parents increases as the 
education level of the household spouse improves, 
while different results were found for the education 
level of household heads. As we cannot distinguish the 
source of parent transfers (i.e. whether they are parents 
of the household head or parents of the spouse), the 
difference results may show the relationship between 
education level on the parents’ transfers: there are some 
parents who were very proud of the education level of 
their children, while others might not be.  However, 
both household head and spouse will be more likely to 
receive transfers from parents if they are unemployed. 
This result indicates that parents seek to help children 
facing liquidity constraints.
4.2.2 Friend transfers
The marginal effects of BLT on the likelihood of 
receiving transfers from friends are presented in Table 
5. When we included only the household characteristics 
as the control variables, BLT significantly reduced the 
possibility for households to receive the transfers from 
friends or neighbors, by 2 percent. However, when 
we added the characteristics of households heads 
and spouses, there is no such significant relationship. 
This result may be because friends or neighbors were 
not well informed about whether the households had 
received the BLT. The friends may live on the different 
neighborhood with the BLT recipients, and they may 
not get full information of the income changes of BLT 
recipients.  Therefore, the relationship between friend 
transfers and the BLT could not be explained well.
Another interesting finding is the possibility of 
receiving transfers from friends or neighbors reduced 
by almost 5 percent for female-headed households. This 
result contradicts some literature that found that female-
headed households are more likely to receive transfers 
than male-headed households, such as Kang (2004). 
The lower likelihood for female-headed households to 
receive friend transfers may be influenced by the reason 
that the household is headed by a female. In Indonesia, 
there remains a cultural stigma against widowed and 
divorced women (Parker, 2016), with communities still 
believing that divorced women are detrimental for 
society, and they are therefore less willing to help such 
women. It may be that the sample of female-headed 
households used in this survey were mostly divorcees, 
which would account for the results showing a negative 
relationship between female-headed households and 
friend transfers.
On the other hand, the possibility to receive 
transfers from friends increased by almost 3 percent 
when the head of a household is unemployed. 
Unemployment is typically a significant issue for a 
community, with unemployed households requiring 
help to fulfill their basic needs. Friends may help their 
friends who do not work, without concern for their 
income changes.
4.2.3 Other family transfers
Table 6 presents the marginal effect of the 
probability of BLT recipients to receive transfers from 
other family members (non-co-residents). BLT reduces 
the likelihood of households to receive a transfer from 
other family by up to 5 percent. This relationship is 
significant, at 1 percent significance level. These findings 
support previous studies that argue that private transfers 
are altruistically motivated (Cox, Hansen and Jimenez, 
2004; Kang, 2004; Lai, 2009). Lai (2009) found that, in 
Taiwan, $1 of public transfers displaces 30-50 cents of 
inter-household transfers. Moreover, Park (2003) found 
that recipients’ incomes (permanent and transitory) 
are negatively correlated with transfers received from 
siblings.
In contrast to transfers from parents and friends or 
neighbors, transfers from other family members seem 
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to be significantly affected by the characteristics of 
households. The more dependents in a household, the 
more likely for that households to receive transfers from 
other family, by almost 8 percent. Surprisingly, while 
households in urban areas receive more transfers from 
parents, the location of households are not statistically 
significant to affect the transfers from other family 
members. This difference can be explained by other 
family members living spread across both urban and 
rural areas.
By including the education variable, it is apparent 
that the education level of household head and spouse 
is statistically significant in reducing the probability of 
receiving transfers. The higher the education level, the 
less likely it is for a household to receive transfers from 
other family members. Other family members may 
think that the more educated the household head and 
spouse, the wealthier the household, and therefore that 
more-educated households require less help than less-
educated households.
As expected, households that have a higher share 
of education expenditure have a lower probability of 
receiving transfers from other family members. As 
described above, in this study we proxy income by 
expenditure share, with higher education expenditure 
indicating richer households that are less likely to 
need help from private transfers. On the other hand, 
households who spend more on food have a greater 
probability of receiving transfers from other family 
members. Again, we have posited that the higher a 
household’s share of food expenditure, the poorer it 
is. It is more likely for such poor households to receive 
transfers from other family members (non-co-resident).
5. CONCLUSION 
Using the Coarsened Exact Matching (CEM) 
method, this study has shown that the public transfer 
(BLT) reduced the possibility that a household received 
transfers from non-co-resident family members. 
We found that the likelihood for a household to 
receive transfers from other family reduces when the 
household receives public cash transfers (BLT).  When 
the BLT program was implemented, people have a 
propensity to reduce or even to stop their transfers 
to poor households who receive BLT. Therefore, the 
income of the households who usually receive from 
private transfers will be the same after they receive BLT. 
Thus, it is still hard for them to face the inflation. Cash 
assistance programs designed to help the poor through 
times of economic hardship turned out to have less 
favorable effects, including reducing inter-household 
transfers.
The indication of a crowding-out effect may inhibit 
the effectiveness of cash transfer policies, as public 
cash transfers only serve to substitute the informal 
social safety net. A suggestion derived from these 
findings is for policymakers to consider the possibility 
of this crowding-out effect when targeting recipients 
for cash transfers. The government should give priority 
to poor households who do not have relatives to be 
recipients of these transfers. On the other hand, we 
found there was no significant effect of cash transfers 
on the transfers from parents and friends or neighbors. 
6. LIMITATION
Altruism may therefore not be the motivation 
for parents and friends in providing transfers to 
households. However, this study limit the analysis only 
on the recipients. Therefore, in future studies, it might 
be interesting to include the wealth of the donor (i.e. 
parents and friends) to examine further the impact of 
cash transfers on private transfers.
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TABLE
Table 1 : 14 Variable Indicators for targeted households
No Variables
1 The floor area of the residence is less than 8 square meters per person
2 The floor of the house is made of soil, bamboo or cheap wood
3 The walls of the house are made of bamboo, low-quality wood, or the walls without plaster
4 There is no toilet facility in the house
5 There is no electricity in the house
6 Source of drinking water from wells or unprotected springs, rivers or rainwater
7 The fuel for daily cooking is firewood, charcoal or kerosene
8 Eat milk, meat or chicken no more than once a week
9 Buy a pair of new clothes only once a year
10 Only eat one or two times a day
11 Notable to pay for the cost of treatments in health centers
12 Source of income of household heads is from farming with a land area of 0.5 acres or as a farm laborer, fisherman, construction worker, plantation worker or other jobs with an income of less than Rp600.000 per year
13 Educational attainment of household heads is no schooling or not completed primary school, or only completed primary school
14 Do not have savings or salable goods with a value of at least Rp500.000
Source : BPS (2005)
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Table 2 : Descriptive summary
Variables Full Sample
Parents Transfer Friends Transfer Other Family Transfer
Not 
Receive Receive diff
Not 
Receive Receive diff
Not 
Receive Receive diff
BLT 0.138 0.186 0.136 0.050*** 0.149 0.134 0.015** 0.159 0.122 0.037***
(0.345) (0.390) (0.343) (0.356) (0.340) (0.365) (0.328)
yrafter 0.582 0.675 0.578 0.097*** 0.591 0.579 0.012 0.574 0.589 -0.015*
(0.493) (0.469) (0.494) (0.492) (0.494) (0.495) (0.492)
No_electricity 0.065 0.035 0.066 -0.031*** 0.072 0.062 0.010** 0.062 0.067 -0.004
(0.246) (0.185) (0.249) (0.258) (0.241) (0.242) (0.249)
water_pipe 0.913 0.912 0.913 -0.001 0.914 0.912 0.001 0.933 0.897 0.036***
(0.282) (0.284) (0.282) (0.281) (0.283) (0.251) (0.304)
no_toilet 0.299 0.294 0.299 -0.005 0.309 0.295 0.015* 0.312 0.289 0.023***
(0.458) (0.456) (0.458) (0.462) (0.456) (0.463) (0.453)
rent_house 0.078 0.048 0.08 -0.032*** 0.077 0.079 -0.002 0.055 0.097 -0.043***
(0.269) (0.214) (0.271) (0.267) (0.270) (0.228) (0.297)
floor_bamboo 0.108 0.136 0.106 0.030** 0.116 0.104 0.011* 0.111 0.105 0.006
(0.310) (0.343) (0.308) (0.320) (0.305) (0.314) (0.307)
wall_bamboo 0.086 0.085 0.086 -0.001 0.095 0.082 0.014** 0.099 0.076 0.023***
(0.280) (0.279) (0.280) (0.294) (0.274) (0.298) (0.264)
urban 0.49 0.437 0.493 -0.056*** 0.484 0.493 -0.008 0.476 0.501 -0.025***
(0.500) (0.496) (0.500) (0.500) (0.500) (0.499) (0.500)
dependent_ratio 0.662 0.825 0.653 0.172*** 0.649 0.668 -0.019** 0.659 0.664 -0.005
(0.473) (0.381) (0.476) (0.477) (0.471) (0.474) (0.472)
exp_wfood 58.119 56.398 58.211 -1.813*** 57.767 58.28 -0.513* 58.034 58.188 -0.155
(16.491) (15.444) (16.540) (16.651) (16.415) (16.246) (16.685)
exp_wmedical 1.997 2.449 1.973 0.476* 2.097 1.951 0.147 1.992 2.001 -0.009
(5.013) (5.809) (4.966) (5.275) (4.888) (4.855) (5.137)
exp_weducall 5.915 6.56 5.88 0.680* 5.757 5.987 -0.23 6.298 5.606 0.692***
(10.982) (10.131) (11.025) (10.545) (11.176) (10.230) (11.543)
HH_female 0.12 0.339 0.109 0.231*** 0.131 0.115 0.016** 0.118 0.122 -0.003
(0.325) (0.474) (0.311) (0.337) (0.320) (0.323) (0.327)
HHage 47.266 48.395 47.206 1.189* 46.588 47.57 -0.982 48.539 46.267 2.272***
(33.528) (15.796) (34.216) (32.150) (34.126) (28.049) (37.240)
HH_unemployment 0.117 0.229 0.111 0.119*** 0.111 0.12 -0.009 0.116 0.117 -0.001
(0.321) (0.421) (0.314) (0.314) (0.325) (0.321) (0.322)
spouse_unemployment 0.393 0.401 0.393 0.008 0.385 0.397 -0.013 0.378 0.406 -0.028***
(0.489) (0.490) (0.488) (0.487) (0.489) (0.485) (0.491)
Head_loweduc 0.407 0.442 0.405 0.037* 0.392 0.413 -0.021** 0.424 0.393 0.030***
(0.491) (0.497) (0.491) (0.488) (0.492) (0.494) (0.489)
spouse_loweduc 0.439 0.456 0.438 0.018 0.436 0.44 -0.004 0.462 0.42 0.042***
(0.496) (0.498) (0.496) (0.496) (0.496) (0.499) (0.494)
Head_mideduc 0.319 0.272 0.321 -0.050*** 0.32 0.319 0.001 0.293 0.339 -0.046***
(0.466) (0.445) (0.467) (0.466) (0.466) (0.455) (0.474)
head_higheduc 0.079 0.062 0.08 -0.018* 0.078 0.08 -0.002 0.069 0.087 -0.017***
(0.270) (0.241) (0.271) (0.268) (0.271) (0.254) (0.281)
spouse_mideduc 0.326 0.239 0.331 -0.091*** 0.317 0.33 -0.013 0.301 0.346 -0.045***
(0.469) (0.427) (0.470) (0.465) (0.470) (0.459) (0.476)
spouse_higeduc 0.062 0.041 0.064 -0.022*** 0.065 0.061 0.004 0.057 0.067 -0.010**
(0.242) (0.199) (0.244) (0.247) (0.240) (0.232) (0.250)
Note: This table reports the summary at the mean level; Standard errors are reported in the parenthesis ; 
*** p<0.01, **p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3. Covariate Balance
Pre-matching
Imbalanced = 0.2397
Post-matching
Imbalanced = 3.243e-14
No BLT BLT Mean diff No BLT BLT Mean diff
No_electricity 0.061 0.089 0.028*** 0.089 0.089 -0.000
water_source 0.906 0.953 0.047*** 0.953 0.953 0.000
No_toilet 0.276 0.444 0.168*** 0.444 0.444 -0.000
floor_type 0.094 0.194 0.101*** 0.194 0.194 -0.000
wall_type 0.074 0.163 0.089*** 0.163 0.163 -0.000
Note: This table reports the covariate imbalanced at the mean level, before and after CEM;
* p<0.1;** p<0.05; *** p<0.01
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Table 4: Marginal Effects: Results for Parents Transfers
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
       
yrafter -0.017*** -0.018*** -0.018*** -0.018*** -0.018*** -0.017***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
yrafter_BLT -0.010** -0.006 -0.003 -0.000 -0.000 -0.002
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
No_electricity 0.020** 0.025*** 0.027*** 0.027*** 0.026***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
water_pipe 0.003 0.004 0.006 0.006 0.006
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
no_toilet 0.003 0.004 0.008** 0.007** 0.007*
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
rent_house 0.013* 0.017** 0.016** 0.015** 0.016**
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008)
floor_bamboo -0.000 0.001 0.003 0.003 0.002
(0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
wall_bamboo 0.005 0.003 0.004 0.003 0.002
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
urban 0.008** 0.011*** 0.007** 0.008** 0.008**
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
dependent_ratio 0.047*** 0.045*** 0.047*** 0.044***
(0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
HH_female -0.064*** -0.073*** -0.069*** -0.070***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
HHage 0.000* 0.000** 0.000*** 0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Head_loweduc -0.016*** -0.016*** -0.014***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Head_mideduc -0.025*** -0.023*** -0.021***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
head_higheduc -0.028*** -0.027*** -0.021**
(0.009) (0.009) (0.010)
spouse_loweduc 0.027*** 0.027*** 0.028***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
spouse_mideduc 0.055*** 0.055*** 0.057***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
spouse_higheeduc 0.074*** 0.073*** 0.075***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
HH_unemployment -0.013*** -0.012***
(0.004) (0.004)
spouse_unemployment -0.008** -0.007**
(0.003) (0.003)
exp_wfood 0.000**
(0.000)
exp_wmedical -0.000*
(0.000)
exp_weducall -0.000**
(0.000)
province dummies No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 20,181 20,181 18,215 18,215 18,215 17,951
Pseudo R2 0.00547 0.0440 0.0993 0.120 0.122 0.125
Note : This table reports the marginal effects at the means after CEM. All results are derived from logit regression results. All 
regression are control for province fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at province level. Cluster robust standard errors 
are reported in the parenthesis. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1
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Table 5: Marginal Effects : Results for Friends Transfers
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
       
yrafter -0.005 -0.012 -0.008 -0.008 -0.008 -0.006
(0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
yrafter_BLT -0.025** -0.019* -0.011 -0.012 -0.012 -0.015
(0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
No_electricity -0.036** -0.036** -0.036** -0.035** -0.037**
(0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
water_pipe -0.004 -0.007 -0.008 -0.008 -0.012
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014)
no_toilet -0.004 -0.001 -0.003 -0.002 -0.004
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
rent_house -0.004 -0.003 -0.002 -0.001 -0.003
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014)
floor_bamboo -0.006 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003
(0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
wall_bamboo -0.026** -0.020 -0.020 -0.019 -0.021
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014)
urban 0.009 0.005 0.006 0.004 0.006
(0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
dependent_ratio 0.009 0.008 0.011 0.014
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.018)
HH_female -0.037*** -0.039*** -0.048*** -0.047***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011)
HHage 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Head_loweduc 0.010 0.011 0.014
(0.012) (0.012) (0.013)
Head_mideduc -0.013 -0.013 -0.007
(0.014) (0.014) (0.015)
head_higheduc -0.003 -0.001 0.006
(0.019) (0.019) (0.020)
spouse_loweduc 0.006 0.007 0.007
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
spouse_mideduc 0.019 0.021 0.021
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
spouse_higheeduc 0.003 0.006 0.012
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019)
HH_unemployment 0.029** 0.025**
(0.012) (0.012)
spouse_unemployment 0.008 0.009
(0.007) (0.007)
exp_wfood 0.001**
(0.000)
exp_wmedical -0.001*
(0.001)
exp_weducall 0.000
(0.000)
Province dummies No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 20,181 20,181 18,215 18,215 18,215 17,951
Pseudo R2 0.000360 0.00528 0.00581 0.00621 0.00658 0.00710
Note : This table reports the marginal effects at the means after CEM. All results are derived from logit regression results. All regresion are control 
for province fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at province level. Cluster robust standard errors are reported in the parenthesis. *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 6: Marginal Effects : Results for Other Family Transfers
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
       
yrafter 0.038*** 0.018** 0.013 0.010 0.011 0.012
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
yrafter_BLT -0.093*** -0.065*** -0.055*** -0.049*** -0.048*** -0.051***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
No_electricity 0.047*** 0.046*** 0.046*** 0.047*** 0.041***
(0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
water_pipe -0.068*** -0.068*** -0.060*** -0.060*** -0.064***
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015)
no_toilet -0.011 -0.013 -0.008 -0.007 -0.012
(0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
rent_house 0.098*** 0.093*** 0.090*** 0.090*** 0.084***
(0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
floor_bamboo 0.031** 0.026** 0.026* 0.025* 0.021
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
wall_bamboo -0.030** -0.015 -0.014 -0.014 -0.019
(0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
urban 0.005 0.008 0.003 0.001 0.004
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
dependent_ratio 0.093*** 0.093*** 0.090*** 0.083***
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017)
HH_female 0.023** 0.026** 0.026** 0.025**
(0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012)
HHage -0.000* -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Head_loweduc 0.005 0.005 0.006
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Head_mideduc 0.022 0.020 0.025*
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
head_higheduc 0.048** 0.046** 0.054***
(0.020) (0.020) (0.021)
spouse_loweduc -0.047*** -0.049*** -0.045***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
spouse_mideduc -0.027** -0.030** -0.026*
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
spouse_higheeduc -0.037* -0.033 -0.023
(0.020) (0.020) (0.021)
HH_unemployment 0.001 -0.000
(0.012) (0.012)
spouse_unemployment 0.024*** 0.025***
(0.008) (0.008)
exp_wfood 0.001***
(0.000)
exp_wmedical -0.001
(0.001)
exp_weducall -0.001***
(0.000)
province dummies No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 20,181 20,181 18,215 18,215 18,215 17,951
Pseudo R2 0.00292 0.0384 0.0411 0.0423 0.0427 0.0434
Note : This table reports the marginal effects at the means after CEM. All results are derived from logit regression results. All regresion are 
control for province fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at province level. Cluster robust standard errors are reported in the parenthesis. 
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1
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APPENDIX A : THE VARIABLES
Table A1 : The descriptive of the variables
No Variables Description
1 BLT =1 if receive BLT; 0 if not receive
2 yrafter =1 if 2007 (year after the implementation of BLT); 0 if 2000 (before the implementation of BLT)
3 No_electricity =1 if there is no electricity; 0 otherwise
4 water_pipe =1 if the source of water is pipe ; 0 otherwise
5 no_toilet =1 if there is no toilet at home; 0 otherwise
6 rent_house =1 if the household rents the home ; 0 if not rent
7 floor_bamboo -1 if the floor type of home is bamboo,soil, or cheap wood; 0 otherwise
8 wall_bamboo =1 if the wall type of home is bamboo, low quality wood; 0 otherwise
9 urban =1 if living in urban area; 0 if rural area
10 dependent_ratio the ratio of the dependent in the household compare to total members
11 exp_wfood the share of food expenditure
12 exp_wmedical the share of medical expenditure
13 exp_weducall the share of education expenditure
14 HH_female =1 if the head of household is female; 0 if male headed
15 HHage age of the head of households
16 HH_unemployment =1 if the head of household is unemployee; 0 otherwise
17 spouse_unemployment =1 if the head’s spouse of household is unemployee; 0 otherwise
18 Head_loweduc =1 if the education of household’s head is primary; 0 otherwise
19 spouse_loweduc =1 if the education of the spouse is primary; 0 otherwise
20 Head_mideduc =1 if the education of household’s head is junior and senior high school; 0 otherwise
21 head_higheduc =1 if the education of household’s head is diploma and university; 0 otherwise
22 spouse_mideduc =1 if the education of the spouse is junior and senior high school; 0 otherwise
23 spouse_higeduc =1 if the education of the spouse is diploma and university; 0 otherwise
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APPENDIX B : OLS RESULTS
Table B1: Results for Friends transfer (OLS Analysis)
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
       
yrafter 0.003 -0.005 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.000
(0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
yrafter_BLT -0.028*** -0.024** -0.014 -0.017 -0.017 -0.019
(0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
No_electricity -0.028* -0.028* -0.029* -0.028* -0.031**
(0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
water_pipe -0.010 -0.008 -0.009 -0.009 -0.010
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.019)
no_toilet -0.002 0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.003
(0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
rent_house 0.008 0.008 0.011 0.013 0.009
(0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
floor_bamboo 0.006 0.007 0.005 0.006 0.005
(0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
wall_bamboo -0.023* -0.020 -0.021 -0.020 -0.023
(0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
urban 0.014 0.008 0.010 0.009 0.010
(0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
dependent_ratio 0.015 0.020 0.023 0.022
(0.018) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019)
HH_female -0.046*** -0.049*** -0.058*** -0.057***
(0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
HHage 0.000** 0.000** 0.000* 0.000**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Head_loweduc -0.001 0.000 0.001
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
Head_mideduc -0.025 -0.024 -0.022
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
head_higheduc -0.013 -0.011 -0.008
(0.021) (0.021) (0.022)
spouse_loweduc -0.001 0.001 0.000
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
spouse_mideduc 0.006 0.008 0.007
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
spouse_higheeduc 0.003 0.006 0.010
(0.021) (0.021) (0.022)
HH_unemployment 0.029** 0.027**
(0.013) (0.013)
spouse_unemployment 0.003 0.004
(0.008) (0.008)
exp_wfood 0.001**
(0.000)
exp_wmedical -0.001
(0.001)
exp_weducall 0.001
(0.000)
Province Dummies No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 20166 20166 18200 18200 18200 17936
Adj-Rsquare 0.000279 0.00638 0.00685 0.00693 0.00718 0.00734
Note : This table reports the marginal effects at the means after CEM. All results are derived from OLS regression results. All regresion are 
control for province fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at province level. Cluster robust standard errors are reported in the parenthesis. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table B2: Results for Parents transfer (OLS analysis)
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
       
yrafter -0.016*** -0.017*** -0.019*** -0.019*** -0.019*** -0.018***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
yrafter_BLT -0.011* -0.007 -0.005 -0.003 -0.003 -0.005
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
No_electricity 0.015*** 0.018*** 0.021*** 0.021*** 0.019***
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
water_pipe 0.007 0.006 0.009 0.009 0.008
(0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
no_toilet 0.003 0.003 0.005 0.005 0.003
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
rent_house 0.014*** 0.015*** 0.013** 0.013** 0.011**
(0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006)
floor_bamboo 0.001 0.002 0.004 0.004 0.003
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
wall_bamboo 0.005 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.003
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
urban 0.009** 0.010** 0.008* 0.009** 0.010**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
dependent_ratio 0.038*** 0.028*** 0.028*** 0.025***
(0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
HH_female -0.106*** -0.122*** -0.119*** -0.121***
(0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
HHage 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Head_loweduc -0.030*** -0.030*** -0.029***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Head_mideduc -0.046*** -0.045*** -0.043***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
head_higheduc -0.052*** -0.052*** -0.046***
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
spouse_loweduc 0.038*** 0.037*** 0.039***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
spouse_mideduc 0.066*** 0.066*** 0.068***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
spouse_higheeduc 0.079*** 0.077*** 0.081***
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
HH_unemployment -0.012 -0.010
(0.008) (0.008)
spouse_unemployment -0.009** -0.008**
(0.004) (0.004)
exp_wfood 0.000***
(0.000)
exp_wmedical -0.001
(0.000)
exp_weducall -0.000**
(0.000)
Province Dummies No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 20166 20166 18200 18200 18200 17936
Adj-Rsquare 0.00195 0.0162 0.0459 0.0534 0.0540 0.0559
Note : This table reports the marginal effects at the means after CEM. All results are derived from OLS regression results. All regresion are 
control for province fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at province level. Cluster robust standard errors are reported in the parenthesis. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table B3: Results for  Other Family transfer (OLS analysis)
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
       
yrafter 0.025*** 0.010 0.004 0.001 0.002 0.004
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010)
yrafter_BLT -0.079*** -0.064*** -0.053*** -0.049*** -0.048*** -0.050***
(0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
No_electricity 0.042*** 0.037** 0.037** 0.038** 0.032*
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
water_pipe -0.053** -0.064*** -0.059*** -0.059*** -0.061***
(0.024) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020)
no_toilet -0.006 -0.005 -0.002 -0.001 -0.005
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
rent_house 0.104*** 0.101*** 0.099*** 0.100*** 0.095***
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
floor_bamboo 0.018 0.015 0.014 0.014 0.010
(0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
wall_bamboo -0.024 -0.007 -0.006 -0.006 -0.011
(0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
urban 0.004 0.006 0.004 0.001 0.004
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010)
dependent_ratio 0.078*** 0.083*** 0.080*** 0.076***
(0.019) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020)
HH_female 0.015 0.018 0.016 0.015
(0.012) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014)
HHage -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Head_loweduc 0.004 0.004 0.005
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
Head_mideduc 0.014 0.012 0.016
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017)
head_higheduc 0.043* 0.042* 0.051**
(0.023) (0.023) (0.023)
spouse_loweduc -0.042*** -0.043*** -0.040***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
spouse_mideduc -0.028* -0.029** -0.025*
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
spouse_higheeduc -0.028 -0.024 -0.014
(0.023) (0.023) (0.023)
HH_unemployment 0.008 0.008
(0.013) (0.014)
spouse_unemployment 0.023*** 0.024***
(0.009) (0.009)
exp_wfood 0.001***
(0.000)
exp_wmedical -0.001
(0.001)
exp_weducall -0.001***
(0.000)
Province Dummies No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 20166 20166 18200 18200 18200 17936
Adj-Rsquare 0.00248 0.0466 0.0496 0.0505 0.0509 0.0516
Note : This table reports the marginal effects at the means after CEM. All results are derived from OLS regression results. All regresion are 
control for province fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at province level. Cluster robust standard errors are reported in the parenthesis. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
